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LEVITZ FURNITURE CO.: THE END OF CELANESE AND
THE GOOD-FAITH DOUBT STANDARD FOR
WITHDRAWING RECOGNITION OF INCUMBENT UNIONS
SARAH PAWLICKI∗
INTRODUCTION
For fifty years, the National Labor Relations Board (the
“NLRB”) utilized a seemingly straightforward standard to an employer’s attempt to withdraw recognition of an incumbent union—
whether the employer had a good-faith belief that the union did not
enjoy the support of a majority of the employees.1 In reality, this
standard became muddled when the NLRB applied this same goodfaith standard to an employer’s withdrawal of recognition of an
incumbent union, an employer’s petition for a Representative Management (“RM”) election, and an employer’s poll of its employees to
determine the union’s majority status.2 As a result, the NLRB often
converted the good-faith doubt standard into a higher and more
difficult standard to satisfy, and employers were required to demonstrate their “good faith” with objective evidence that a majority of the
employees renounced their union.3
The United States Supreme Court upheld the good-faith standard in Allentown Mack v. NLRB, holding the application of a
unitary standard to all three forms of tests to a union’s majority status
was consistent with the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”).4
However, the Supreme Court disapproved of the NLRB’s use of the
words “good faith” when in practice the NLRB was applying a
stricter standard.5 The Court held the NLRB, in the interest of
∗ J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, May 2003.
1. See Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1951).
2. See Maria Fabre Manuel, Comment, Abolishing the Withdrawal of Recognition
Doctrine: Serious Doubts about the Good Faith Doubt Test, 55 LA. L. REV. 913, 927 (1995).
3. See Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges to an Incumbent
Union, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 653, 678 (1991).
4. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 364 (1998). In this
article, “the Act” refers to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
5. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., 522 U.S. at 376.
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judicial review, must adhere to the meaning of generally accepted
legal standards.6 In response, the NLRB issued its decision in Levitz
Furniture Company.7
In Levitz, the employer withdrew recognition of the union because of what it believed was evidence of its good-faith doubt of the
union’s majority status, a petition from a majority of the employees
stating the employees no longer wanted to be represented by the
union.8 The NLRB took this opportunity to rectify its unitary goodfaith doubt standard and to formally create a more stringent standard
to which employers must adhere before withdrawing union recognition.9
Pre-Levitz opinions created confusion among employers and
unions regarding the appropriate response when a question existed
about the union’s support from a majority of its members. Levitz was
the NLRB’s effort to clear up the confusion and to promote its
preferred method to determine a union’s status, namely NLRBcontrolled elections.10 In so doing, Levitz actually tied the hands of
employers, who are now forced to continue recognition of a union
that may no longer enjoy majority support. The employer has only
one option outside of obtaining actual objective evidence that the
union no longer enjoys majority support—petition for an RM election
that will be subject to numerous union-initiated blocking charges.11
The impact of Levitz upon labor-management relations remains to be
seen, but most likely it will lead to more incidences of employers
continuing to recognize a union even though that union does not
represent a majority of the employees and to more petitions for RM
elections.
Part I of this Comment describes the union decertification process. Parts II and III will discuss and analyze pre-Levitz decisions of
the NLRB and the Supreme Court’s decision in Allentown Mack.
Part IV will review the Levitz decision. Finally, Part V will discuss

6. Id. at 376–77.
7. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. (Mar. 29, 2001).
8. Id. at 4.
9. See id. at 2.
10. See id. at 15.
11. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 654. Blocking charges are charges of unfair labor practices
filed by a union or an employee against the employer for violations of the Act. No decertification elections may be held while there are pending unfair labor practice charges. Therefore, it is
a common union tactic to file these charges in an effort to delay the election process to provide
time for the union to reorganize and rally the support of the employees.
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the possible impact of Levitz on the future of labor-management
relations.
I.

THE UNION DECERTIFICATION PROCESS

There are three methods by which a new union is certified and an
incumbent union is decertified: withdrawal of recognition, NLRB
controlled elections, and polling. First, however, it is necessary to
discuss at what point an incumbent union’s status may be challenged.
Once a new union is certified, it enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority representation for one year, and an employer is
required to bargain with the union for the remainder of the collective
bargaining agreement, up to three years.12 Only after these terms
have expired, or under extremely unusual circumstances, does the
presumption of majority status become rebuttable.13
The contract bar rule effectively requires the employer to
recognize a union throughout the term of a collective bargaining
agreement, up to three years,14 regardless of the employees’ support
of the union.15 Once the presumption of majority status becomes
rebuttable, the employer has three choices: withdraw recognition
based upon the union’s actual loss of majority support, file a petition
for an RM election with the NLRB based upon the good-faith uncertainty of the union’s majority status, or poll the employees to determine whether there is actual union support.16 In addition, the
employees may file a decertification petition if at least 30 percent of
them wish to determine the majority status of the union.17
A. Unilateral Withdrawal of Recognition
Prior to Levitz, an employer could withdraw recognition of the
union once its status became rebuttable.18 The employer had to show
the withdrawal was based upon a good-faith doubt of the union’s

12. James M.L. Ferber & R. Scott Ferber, Withdrawal of Recognition: The Impact of
Allentown Mack and Lee Lumbar, 14 LAB. LAW 339, 340 (1998).
13. See id. at n.8.
14. NLRB v. Arthur Sarnow Candy Co., 40 F.3d 552, 556–57 (2d Cir. 1994).
15. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 388 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
16. See Manuel, supra note 2, at 916–17.
17. Id. at 916.
18. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 571; see also Manuel, supra
note 2, at 921.
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majority status at the time recognition was withdrawn.19 Until Levitz,
an employer could legally withdraw recognition of an incumbent
union without actual proof of the lost majority status, relying instead
on only a good-faith doubt of the lost status.20
Employers obviously preferred to withdraw recognition over the
other methods because, as long as they could convince the NLRB
their withdrawal was in good faith, they could lawfully discontinue
bargaining with the union.21 The other methods, petitioning for
election and polling, were considerably more cumbersome and time
consuming, and required the employer to continue to negotiate with
the union, possibly allowing the union time to regain support from the
employees.22 Levitz would turn the tables on employers and blatantly
advance the NLRB-favored method of determining a union’s status,
NLRB-controlled elections.23
B.

Petitioning for an RM Election

Before Levitz, employers were permitted to submit a petition for
an RM election based upon the same good-faith doubt standard
applied to the unilateral withdrawal of recognition.24 While the
NLRB favored an election process that it controlled because of the
drawn-out process and the likelihood of the union’s filing unfair labor
practice charges, employers did not favor the RM election.25 If an
employer petitioned for an RM election and the NLRB determined
that the petition was based upon a good-faith doubt of the union’s
majority status, it conducted a carefully orchestrated election to
encourage maximum employee participation and accurate election
results.26 While an RM election did produce accurate results, it also
required the employer to bargain with the union. Therefore, many
employers simply decided to forego the RM election and withdraw
recognition of a union.27 After all, the same good-faith doubt stan19. Manuel, supra note 2, at 921.
20. Id.
21. Comment, Application of the Good-Faith-Doubt Test to the Presumption of Continued
Majority Status of Incumbent Unions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 718, 732 (1981).
22. See id. at 730–31.
23. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 15 (Mar. 29,
2001).
24. Id. at 14.
25. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 654.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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dard applied to both the withdrawal of recognition as well as the
petition for an RM election.
C.

Employer Polling

Employer-conducted polling is the NLRB’s least-favored decertification instrument.28 Polling allows an employer to quickly determine the actual employee support for a union.29 However, the results
of polls have been deemed by the NLRB to be unreliable and fraught
with unfair labor practices.30 NLRB-controlled elections are conducted under tight watch and anything less than these controls invites
unfair labor practices charges.31

D. Employee Decertification
Finally, employees may file a decertification (“RD”) for an election upon showing 30 percent of the employees desire to withdraw
from the union.32 This petition is therefore most useful when the
employees are well organized and knowledgeable.33 Since the employees file the RD petition, there is no showing necessary of the
employer’s good-faith doubt. Levitz had no impact on the RD
petition and it continues to be a viable method of union decertification.
II. RELEVANT DECISIONS PRIOR TO LEVITZ FURNITURE CO.
Over the years, the NLRB has developed and extended the
good-faith doubt standard to the withdrawal of incumbent union
recognition, petitions for RM elections, and polls of employees.34
This Section will discuss the relevant cases and doctrine leading up to

28. See id. at 663.
29. Id. at 665.
30. Id. at 664. In Struksnes Construction Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967), the NLRB
held that employer polls would constitute an unfair labor practice unless: the poll is to
determine whether the validity of a union’s claims to majority status; this purpose is told to the
employees; employees are assured that there will be no reprisal; the poll is conducted by secret
ballot; and the atmosphere is not coercive.
31. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 665–66.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000); see also 1 JOHN D. FEERICK ET AL., NLRB
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 191 (3d ed. Supp. 1989).
33. See Comment, supra note 21, at 730.
34. See infra Part II.A–C.
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Levitz: Celanese Corp. (good-faith doubt standard is applied to
35
employer’s withdrawing recognition of a union); U.S. Gypsum
(good-faith doubt standard is applied to employer’s petition for an
RM election);36 and Texas Petrochemicals Corp. (good-faith doubt
standard is applied to employer’s polling of employees).37
A. Celanese and the Good-faith Doubt Standard
In 1951, the NLRB set the standard for employers to withdraw
recognition from unions that the employer believed no longer represented a majority of the employees. In Celanese Corp. of America,38
the NLRB decided the employer only needed a good-faith belief that
a majority of the employees no longer supported the union to withdraw recognition.39 The Celanese decision guided NLRB decisions for
the next fifty years and paved the way for the development of a
method for employers to withdraw union recognition.
Celanese Corporation (“Celanese”) opened a plant in Texas in
1945, and several months later a union was certified as the bargaining
representative of the employees.40 In 1948, Celanese and the union
entered into negotiations; however, they reached an impasse over
wage rates, broke off the negotiations, and the union called a strike
that completely shut down the plant.41 After two months, Celanese
decided to reopen its plant and offered any employee who returned
to work a raise equivalent to what had been offered to, and rejected
by, the union.42 Eventually all of the positions were filled at the
Celanese plant, and employees hired outside the plant replaced any
striking employees who did not return to work.43 The union requested renewed bargaining; however, Celanese responded that it
was operating at full capacity and that “to the best of our [Celanese’s]
knowledge and belief, the Union does not represent any of the
employees now working in this plant.”44 Although the trial examiner
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
mately

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
See id. at 671.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 670. In actuality, Celanese was operating at full capacity but with only approxi50% of the original number of employees. The NLRB held that this workforce
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held the union had represented a majority of the employees hired
back in 1948, the lapse of three years since the last certification
rebutted the presumption of continued majority support.45
The NLRB agreed with the trial examiner’s decision that Celanese had not violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act, but disagreed with
the trial examiner’s rationale and changed the method by which
employers could withdraw union recognition.46 The NLRB changed
the question presented by the trial examiner from “whether there was
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of continued majority
status or to demonstrate that the Union in fact did not represent the
majority of the employees” to “whether the Employer in good faith
believed that the Union no longer represented the majority of the
employees.”47 The NLRB further stated that the good-faith issue
could not be determined through a formula, but rather by taking into
account all circumstances of the decision to withdraw recognition.48
To accomplish this, the NLRB held that two prerequisites were
essential to finding the employer acted in good faith in withdrawing
recognition of a previously certified union.49 First, the employer must
have possessed reasonable grounds for believing the union no longer
enjoyed majority support.50 Second, the withdrawal of recognition
based on the lack of majority support could not have occurred during
times of other unfair labor practice violations or antiunion activities
intended to undermine union support.51 The NLRB in Celanese held
the record did not indicate any reason for finding that the company
had not acted in good faith.52 Since Celanese acted in good faith,
there was no need to decide whether or not the union actually represented a majority of the employees.53

reduction resulted from the hiring of an independent contractor to handle much of the plant
maintenance and the improved operating methods that were implemented during the strike.
The NLRB held that these workforce reductions were lawful. Id.
45. Id. at 671.
46. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 673.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 675.
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United States Gypsum and the Standard for Petitions for
Elections

In the 1966 decision United States Gypsum Co., the NLRB held
when a certified union requests recognition, the employer must prove
it has reasonable grounds for doubting the majority status of the
union to request an RM election.54 The extension of the good-faith
doubt standard to RM petitions was an effort to protect incumbent
unions from repeated election petitions that employers tended to
bring at the end of contracts or whenever a company was sold.55 The
NLRB’s decision rested on the goal of protecting the rights of the
employees through continuity and stability in the bargaining of the
employer and the incumbent union.56
This decision involved U.S. Gypsum’s purchase of a quarry, lime
plant, and mine from United Cement Company.57 U.S. Gypsum
temporarily closed operations and upon reopening rehired all but
three of United Cement’s former employees.58 However, U.S.
Gypsum refused to check off union dues as required under the union
contract with United Cement.59 After the union filed a grievance,
U.S. Gypsum withdrew recognition of the union.60 U.S. Gypsum then
filed a petition for a representation election.61 The NLRB decided
this matter could be decided on a more fundamental principle,
namely, whether U.S. Gypsum could, in good faith, doubt the continued majority representation of the union and therefore be entitled to
an RM election.62
The employer’s good-faith doubt of majority status was not questioned upon the filing of a petition for an RM election.63 Previous
NLRB decisions had held that if an employer filed a petition for an
election to determine the standing of a union that claimed to represent the employees, and the employer declined to recognize the

54. U.S. Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (1966).
55. Id. at 655.
56. See id. at 655–56.
57. Id. at 653.
58. Id. Two of the employees did not pass the physical examination and one of the
employees resigned. Id. at n.1.
59. See id. at 653–54.
60. Id. at 654.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 654–55.
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union, a question concerning representation had been raised.64
However, in evaluating the petitions, the NLRB had not questioned
the good faith of the employer’s withdrawal of recognition; furthermore, when the employer was a new owner, the NLRB consistently
granted the petitions for election.65 The NLRB in U.S. Gypsum held
a new owner could not justify refusing to bargain with a certified
union by relying solely upon its new ownership.66
The NLRB looked to the legislative history of section 9(c)(1)(B)
of the Act to decide when an employer could petition for a representation election.67 The NLRB’s analysis of the section did not find a
unilateral right for employers to question a union’s majority status.68
Rather, it found Congress’ underlying purpose was to permit elections when employers had “reasonable grounds for believing” that
the union no longer represented a majority of the employees.69 Thus,
the NLRB concluded Congress required a good-faith doubt for an
employer to question the majority status of a union and to request an
RM petition.70
The decision in U.S. Gypsum stood for the proposition that when
an employer wished to file a petition for election, it needed objective
evidence to support its reasonable belief for doubting the union’s
majority status.71 This decision, while seeming to clear up the confusion over whether a petition for an RM election should be granted,
effectively created additional confusion by employing the same
standard used for an employer seeking to withdraw union recognition.72
The NLRB’s attempt to restrain employers from constantly petitioning for election by requiring good-faith doubt clearly backfired.
Instead of petitioning for election, the employers withdrew recognition of the union and refused to bargain based upon the same goodfaith doubt that would have permitted a certification election.73 To
quell this effect, the NLRB began interpreting the good-faith doubt
64. Id. at 654 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. X-ray, 129 N.L.R.B. 846, 847 (1960);
Andrews Indus., Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 946 (1953)).
65. Id. at 654–55.
66. Id. at 655.
67. See id. at 655–56.
68. Id. at 656.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 654.
73. See id. at 678.
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requirement in such a way as to make the requirement increasingly
difficult to meet.74 This would result in the United States Supreme
Court decision in Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB.75
Before the Allentown Mack decision, however, the NLRB would also
apply the good-faith doubt standard to employee polling.
C.

Texas Petrochemicals and the Polling Standard

Employers who wished to poll their employees regarding their
support for the incumbent union would also be required to demonstrate good-faith doubt. In 1989, the NLRB issued its decision on the
matter in Texas Petrochemicals.76 The administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) found the employer violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act77 by conducting its own poll of its employees, without notifying
the union in advance, to determine whether there was continued
majority support of the union.78 The decision came after several
circuits refused to extend the “reasonable doubt” standard to polling.79 The NLRB stated that the reasonable doubt standard was
appropriate for polling because “[t]he similarity of purposes and
potential consequences of employer-conducted polls and employerinitiated, NLRB conducted RM elections suggests that we apply
similar standards for determining when such polls and elections may
be conducted.”80 This analysis neglected to consider that the employer may withdraw recognition of a union based upon this same
standard, and that poll results are inherently less reliable than an
NLRB-conducted RM election.81 The NLRB’s decision in Texas
Petrochemicals created the quagmire that eventually led to the
problem presented in Levitz.

74. Id. at 678–79.
75. See infra Part III.
76. Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively
with employees’ representatives. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice “to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” their rights under 29 U.S.C. §
157 (giving employees the right to bargain collectively, among others).
78. See Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. at 1058.
79. See id. at 1059. (citing Forbidden City Rest. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1984);
Thomas Indus. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d
1141 (5th Cir. 1981)).
80. Id. at 1060.
81. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 660.
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In 1984, Texas Petrochemical Corporation purchased the PetroTex Chemical Corporation, which had 103 union members.82 The
President of the company spoke with several employees who said that
the union did not enjoy majority support.83 Over the next several
weeks, company supervisors reported twenty-three different employees who expressed unhappiness with the union.84 The company
decided that there was sufficient uncertainty to warrant a poll, which
resulted in thirty-five votes in favor of the union and fifty votes in
opposition.85 The company then notified the union that the employees had voted to discontinue union representation and that the
company would no longer recognize the union.86
The NLRB held the company had violated sections 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act for lack of sufficient evidence to constitute a reasonable
doubt of the majority status of the union to conduct a poll.87 The
NLRB applied a reasonable doubt standard to polling, contrary to the
decisions of three circuits.88 The NLRB disagreed with the analysis of
the circuit courts and decided that employers may withdraw recognition of unions with the support of poll results that reflect a loss of
majority status because a proper poll was the same as if an NLRB
election had occurred.89 For this reason, the NLRB felt similar
standards should be applied to each method of determining whether a
union had maintained majority support.90 In fact, the NLRB suggested that employer-conducted polls should face higher standards
since the polls were conducted outside of the watchful eye of the
NLRB, unlike the “strict procedural formality of Board-conducted
RM elections.”91 The NLRB’s apparent distrust of the results of
employer polls did not lead it to abandon this procedure, but rather
to bolster the standard to conduct such a poll.92 While the NLRB
recognized the employer’s right to poll and that such polls did not

82. Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. at 1057.
83. Id. at 1057.
84. Id. at 1057–58.
85. See id. at 1058. Out of the 103 eligible employees, eighty-six votes were submitted; one
vote was void. There was no explanation provided for the other seventeen eligible employees.
Id. at n.7.
86. Id. at 1058.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1059.
89. See id. at 1059–60.
90. Id. at 1060.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1061.
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need to be conducted with the stringent formalities of the RM elections, it also held unions must be notified in advance of a poll and that
the employer should adhere to the procedural safeguards of Struksnes
Construction Co.93
Because polling, RM elections, and withdrawal of recognition
could all possibly result in the employees’ loss of representation and
the union’s loss of recognition, the NLRB reasoned that the same
standard should be applied to each method.94 It noted it favored
Board-conducted RM elections over polling, but recognized employers’ right to poll.95
The rationale of Texas Petrochemicals is curious. On the one
hand it said that the reasonable doubt standard is sufficient to petition for an RM election, polls, or even withdrawal of union recognition altogether. However, it also indicated that the NLRB clearly
preferred the RM elections and distrusted employer polling, while not
even discussing unilateral withdrawal of recognition.
Rather than permit an employer unilaterally to subject a collectivebargaining representative to an in-house test of strength under circumstances where the Board itself would refuse to conduct such a
test, the Board requires at least as stringent an evidentiary loss-ofsupport predicate for an employer-conducted in-house election as
that which is required for a Board-conducted election.96

After the NLRB established a unitary standard, employers were
left to decide whether their information regarding the majority status
of a union was sufficient enough to meet the good-faith doubt standard. The NLRB’s interest in promoting industrial stability, which
led to the good faith doubt standard, resulted in a unitary standard
that actually encouraged employers to unilaterally withdraw recognition of a union.97 Consequently, employers would forego the petition
or polling route and withdraw recognition of the union based upon
their good faith doubt.
This unitary standard clouded the meaning of the good-faith
doubt test.98 The NLRB stated that employers did not need objective
proof that a majority of the employees did not support the union, but

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.; see also Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
See Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. at 1066.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1060–61.
See Flynn, supra note 3, at 661.
See id. at 654.
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that multiple factors could support good-faith doubt.99 However,
after the Texas Petrochemicals decision, it became increasingly
evident that the NLRB was requiring objective proof that would
support the employer’s good faith doubt.100 This continued until
Allentown Mack was decided in 1998.101
III. ALLENTOWN MACK: THE SUPREME COURT’S ATTEMPT TO
SETTLE THE GOOD-FAITH DOUBT TEST
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court attempted to settle
once and for all the meaning of the good-faith doubt standard. The
Court in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB determined
that the good-faith reasonable doubt standard was consistent with the
Act.102 However, the Court took exception with the NLRB’s definition of good faith.103 Although the NLRB had argued doubt meant
disbelief, the Court disagreed, stating “[t]he Board’s finding to the
contrary rests on a refusal to credit probative circumstantial evidence,
and on evidentiary demands that go beyond the substantive standard
the Board purports to apply.”104 The Court was attempting to put to
rest the problems that had developed with the good-faith doubt test,
namely that the NLRB was actually requiring objective proof that the
union no longer enjoyed majority support, rather than simply a goodfaith doubt by the employer.105
Allentown Mack arose from this disagreement over the meaning
of good-faith doubt. In 1990, Allentown Mack purchased a factory
branch of Mack Trucks.106 Near the time of the sale, several Mack
employees told Allentown Mack that they no longer supported the
incumbent union.107 After the sale, the union requested that Allentown Mack recognize their representation of the employees.108 The
company responded that it had a good-faith doubt that the union still
represented a majority of the employees, and that the company would
be conducting a secret poll of the employees to determine if there was
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 679–80
See id.
Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
See id. at 372–73.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
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majority support.109 The poll was conducted and the union lost
nineteen to thirteen.110 The ALJ decided that the Company had
violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) because the Company conducted a
poll and withdrew recognition of the union without an “objective
reasonable doubt” of the union’s majority status.111 The court of
appeals upheld the judge’s decision.112
The Supreme Court recognized that “[c]ourts must defer to the
requirements imposed by the Board if they are ‘rational and consistent with the Act.’”113 While ruling that the use of a unitary standard
is not inconsistent with the Act, the Court decided that the evidence
did not support the NLRB’s finding that Allentown Mack did not
have a reasonable doubt.114
The Court first discussed Allentown Mack’s contention that the
NLRB’s unitary standard made it irrational for an employer to
conduct a poll, thus making polls useless, since the same standard was
required for the employer to withdraw recognition of a union.115 The
Court rejected this argument, stating situations exist when an employer might choose to simply poll the employees, rather than make
the more drastic decision to unilaterally withdraw recognition.116 An
employer that has a good-faith doubt may choose to poll its employees to gain conclusive evidence of the fact that the union no longer
enjoys majority status.117 Since the NLRB argued that polling should
require a more rigorous standard because of its obvious preference
for the RM election, a counter argument existed that would require a
less stringent standard for polling.118 The Court noted a union that
lost a poll could request an election, but a union that lost an election
could not seek another election for one year.119 To settle this dispute,
the Court found it not irrational to “split the difference” and required
the same standard for both polls and elections.120
109. Id.
110. Id. at 362–63.
111. Id. at 363.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 364 (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42
(1987)).
114. Id. at 380.
115. Id. at 364.
116. See id. at 365.
117. Id. (citing Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. at 1063).
118. See id. at 365–66.
119. Id. at 366.
120. Id.
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The Court held the unitary good-faith doubt standard was rational, but decided that the application of the standard by the NLRB
to the facts of the case was not.121 The NLRB’s definition of “doubt”
in the polling standard only meant “disbelief” and not “uncertainty.”122 The Court took exception to this “linguistic revisionism”
and held that a reasonable jury could have found Allentown had a
reasonable uncertainty (not disbelief) that the union no longer
represented a majority of the employees.123 The Court reasoned the
NLRB’s standard of disbelief demanded the Company provide more
evidence than the substantive standard actually required.124
Later in the opinion, the Court discussed the Administrative
Procedure Act and the NLRB’s decision-making authority.125 The
Court noted reasoned decision-making required the uniform application of judicial standards,126 and consistently requiring a different
standard than the pronounced standard did not achieve this goal.127
The Court chided the NLRB:
Reviewing courts are entitled to take those standards to mean what
they say, and to conduct substantial-evidence review on that basis.
Even the most consistent and hence predictable Board departure
from proper application of those standards will not alter the legal
rule by which the agency’s fact-finding is to be judged.128

The Court noted that the NLRB possessed the power to adopt
substantive law; however, in this case the NLRB consistently discounted some evidence and amplified what the evidence must
prove.129 To create substantive law, the NLRB needed to act consistently with “clearly understood legal standards.”130
Allentown Mack was the Court’s effort to restrain the NLRB’s
adjudicating authority. The opinion required the NLRB to conform
to the legal standards of the judiciary system so that, in judicial
review, courts could understand the rule of law that the NLRB had
set in place.131 The NLRB read this decision as an opportunity to
121. Id. at 380.
122. Id. at 367.
123. Id. at 367–68.
124. See id. at 368.
125. Id. at 374. The Administrative Procedure Act governs the proceedings of administrative agencies and related judicial review. Id. (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 374.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 376–77.
129. Id. at 378.
130. Id. at 376.
131. See id.
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promulgate new legal rules that conformed to the Supreme Court’s
“legal standards” and overturned a fifty-year-old precedent in Levitz
Furniture.
IV. LEVITZ FURNITURE
On March 29, 2001, the NLRB issued its decision in Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific.132 The NLRB held that employers could no
longer permissibly withdraw recognition of a union based upon a
good-faith belief that a majority of the employees no longer support
the union.133
A. Facts
Levitz Furniture Company of the Pacific (“Levitz”) was a retail
furniture sales company located in San Francisco, California.134 Levitz
received a petition from a majority of the employees asserting they no
longer wished to be represented by the union in upcoming negotiations.135 Levitz promptly notified the union that, pursuant to the
petition, it would no longer recognize the union after its current
contract expired.136 The union responded two weeks later stating it
had proof it continued to enjoy the support of a majority of the
employees, although it did not provide the nature of the evidence and
Levitz did not request it.137 Nonetheless, Levitz withdrew recognition
of the union at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement,
relying on the petition from the employees, which it felt supported its
good-faith belief that the union no longer represented a majority of
the employees.138
B.

Unfair Labor Practice Charges

Upon the withdrawal of recognition of the union by Levitz, the
union filed charges with the NLRB alleging Levitz violated sections
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.139 Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. (Mar. 29, 2001).
Id.at 4.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
See id. at 12–13.
Id. at 5–6.
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practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees. . . .”140 Section 8(a)(1) prohibits
employers from impeding employees in exercising their section 7
rights.141 Section 7 guarantees all employees the opportunity to
engage in collective bargaining through labor organizations.142 The
union’s charges resulted from Levitz’s decision to withdraw recognition of the union at the expiration of its collective bargaining agreement.143
The NLRB decided Levitz had demonstrated a good-faith uncertainty as to the majority support of the union.144 However, in doing
this, the NLRB overruled precedent and significantly changed the
good-faith doubt standard for employers who wish to withdraw
recognition of an incumbent union.145 For fifty years, Celanese had
permitted employers to withdraw recognition of a union based upon
“whether the Employer in good faith believed that the Union no
longer represented the majority of the employees.”146 However,
Levitz ended the good-faith doubt test as applied to the unilateral
withdraw of recognition and instead extended this standard to employers who wished to obtain an RM election.147
V. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF PRECEDENT TO LEVITZ
FURNITURE CO.
At first blush the NLRB’s decision to overrule Celanese seemed
to be a blow to employers who, just two years before, were at least
partially victorious in the Supreme Court’s decision in Allentown
Mack. In applying the good-faith doubt standard to situations in
which majority union representation was in question, Levitz is not far
from what the NLRB had actually been doing for years.148 While
purporting to rely on a good-faith doubt standard, the NLRB had
been requiring far more, going so far as to require actual objective
evidence that the employees did not wish to be represented by the
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
142. See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
143. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 4.
144. Id. at 19.
145. See id. at 21.
146. Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 671 (1951) (emphasis omitted).
147. See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 2.
148. Martha B. Pedrick, Withdrawal of Recognition: NLRB Toughens, Loosens Standards,
52 LAB. L.J. 166, 171 (2001).
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union before the employer’s decision could have been made in good
faith.
A. Actual Loss of Majority Status Required for Withdrawal of Union
Recognition.
Celanese established the good-faith doubt standard for withdrawing recognition of a union that no longer represented a majority of
the employees.149 Over the years, the NLRB grew uncomfortable
with this standard as it afforded the employer too much control over
union recognition. It felt good faith was not a difficult standard to
meet, and under the guise of industrial stability and protecting
employees’ rights to representation, made it increasingly difficult to
satisfy.150 For example, Joan Flynn, a former field attorney for the
NLRB, has noted that “high employee turnover, a small or declining
number of union members or employees authorizing union dues
deductions, employee disinterest in union activity, inactivity on the
union’s part . . . and employee statements regarding other employees’
opposition to the union” did not warrant a good-faith doubt.151 The
NLRB had taken the good-faith doubt standard and run with it.
The NLRB converted the good-faith doubt standard over the
years to require positive proof of the union’s loss of majority support.152 The NLRB’s actions had functionally overruled Celanese by
using the good-faith disbelief test instead of the good-faith uncertainty as set out in Allentown Mack.153 As a result, the Levitz decision
formally articulated how the NLRB had acted for several years. In
Allentown Mack the Supreme Court warned the NLRB not to
establish a good-faith doubt standard while holding employers to
something more.154 The NLRB corrected this by changing the standard to meet its requirement that an employer should not be able to

149. Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. at 671.
150. Flynn, supra note 3, at 679.
151. Id. at 678–79.
152. See Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 372 (1989). The
NLRB answered this accusation by stating that it did not require a “strict head count.” The
Court disagreed stating that the NLRB “regularly rejected similarly persuasive demonstrations
of reasonable good-faith doubt.” Id.
153. See id. at 367.
154. See id. at 378.
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withdraw recognition of a union without the union’s actual loss of
majority support.155
In Levitz, the NLRB began its analysis by dealing with the Allentown Mack decision.156 In light of the Supreme Court’s finding that
the NLRB could establish more stringent evidentiary burdens provided that there was sufficient notice, the NLRB stated: “In our view,
there is no basis in either law or policy for allowing an employer to
withdraw recognition from an incumbent union that retains the
support of a majority of the unit employees, even on a good-faith
belief that majority support has been lost.”157
1.

Requirements in the Language of the Act

The NLRB noted that the language of the Act did not mention
anything about an employer’s doubt of the union’s majority status.158
Celanese had decided that, after the one-year certification period in
which union representation could not be challenged, the presumption
of majority support was rebuttable and the employer could refuse to
bargain with a union that the employer in good faith believed no
longer represented a majority of employees.159 In Levitz, the NLRB
opined that it was under no obligation from the text of the Act to
extend such a good-faith doubt standard.160 In addition, the NLRB
held that the policy behind of the Act (and Celanese) also did not
support an employer’s unilateral withdrawal of recognition of a
union.161
2.

The Policy of the Act

The policy behind the Act is well established: promotion of stability in bargaining relationships, protection of the employees’ right to
select representation, and encouragement of collective bargaining.162
The Levitz decision rested upon the theory that continued union
majority status is important to each of these policies.163 Industrial
155.
2001).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 2 (Mar. 29,
See id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951).
See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 10.
See id.
Id. at 9.
See id.
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stability is protected because employers may not continually refuse to
bargain with a union simply because of a good-faith doubt.164 Collective bargaining is encouraged because the employer must continue to
bargain with the union until the union has actually lost support of a
majority of the employees, and in that regard the employees’ right of
representation is protected because an employer may not unilaterally
withdraw recognition.165
These policy reasons were also considered by the Celanese
Board, but it decided these policies were served through other
protections, such as the presumption of majority status for one year
after certification, the contract bar rule, and the requirement that the
employer must bargain with the union unless it in good faith doubts
the union’s continued majority status.166 The NLRB recognized
Celanese Corporation’s consistent efforts to promote collective
bargaining prior to its development of the good-faith doubt.167
Essentially, since in the past the employer promoted collective
bargaining, its withdrawal of recognition must have been in good
faith.168 The Levitz Board was not willing to extend its faith in the
employers in such a broad manner.
The Levitz Board pointed out that allowing employers to
unilaterally withdraw recognition of a union violated the fundamental
policies of the Act by harming bargaining relationships and taking
away the employees’ right to representation.169 What the NLRB
neglected to consider, however, were those situations in which the
union had actually lost majority status. The new standard requires
the employer to continue negotiating with a union that does not
represent a majority of the employees until an election can take
place.170 In the past, employers felt they were in a catch-22: by withdrawing recognition they could possibly face charges for refusing to
bargain with employee representatives under sections 8(a)(5) and (1);
however, by bargaining with a nonmajority union, employers could
face charges under section 8(a)(2).171 Levitz curtailed this fear by
164. See id. at 10.
165. See id. at 9–10.
166. See Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 671–72 (1951).
167. Id. at 674.
168. See id.
169. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 10.
170. See Pedrick, supra note 148, at 172.
171. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (2), (5) (2000). Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor
practice for a company to dominate or control a labor union, and this has been extended to
showing support by bargaining with a minority union. See also Flynn, supra note 3, at 665.
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pointing out that if an employer cannot prove a union has actually
lost majority support, it cannot be charged with bargaining with a
nonmajority union because of the presumption that the union continues to enjoy majority support.172
The good-faith standard, and now the actual loss standard, are
ways for employers to rebut the presumption of majority support for
a union. Without absolute proof of the union’s loss of majority
support, Levitz holds that employers should not be permitted to
withdraw recognition.173 However, the NLRB, in its avowed interest
of protecting employee representation, has bought a union that has
lost majority status time to regain employee support through the
delay of blocking charges.174 Prior to Levitz, an employer’s good-faith
belief that its employees no longer wanted to be represented by the
union entitled the employer to withdraw recognition and to stop
bargaining with that union. The NLRB in Levitz felt the protection
of union recognition was a greater concern than the employer’s
concern over bargaining with a nonmajority union.175
After taking away employers’ ability to withdraw recognition
based upon a good-faith doubt, and attempting to clear up any
remaining confusion of the good-faith doubt standard, the NLRB also
felt it necessary to address the use of the standard in RM elections.176
B.

The New Lower Standard for Obtaining an RM Election

The NLRB has not concealed its preference for Board-controlled
elections to determine employees’ union support.177 It put this
preference into action in Levitz when it decided to lower the standard
for obtaining RM elections. U.S. Gypsum determined an employer
had to show a good-faith doubt of the majority support of a union
before it could petition for election.178 However, as in the case of
withdrawing recognition, this standard had been twisted to require
Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain with employee representatives.
172. See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 12.
173. Id.
174. See Pedrick, supra note 148, at 167.
175. See generally Memorandum from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, General Counsel, National
Labor Relations Board, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers
(Oct. 22, 2001), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/gcmemo/gc02-01.html [hereinafter Rosenfeld].
176. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 15.
177. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969).
178. See supra Section II.B.
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objective evidence of the loss of majority support.179 Again, the
NLRB was called upon to clarify the meaning of good-faith doubt.180
The NLRB clearly wanted to promote the use of RM elections as
an alternative to the unilateral withdrawal of recognition.181 The
NLRB even pointed out an obvious contradiction: employers who
have a good-faith doubt of the union’s majority status would rather
withdraw recognition and hope to make a showing of the fact when
responding to unfair labor practice charges, rather than petition the
NLRB and wait for the results of an RM election.182 Therefore, with
regards to RM petitions, the NLRB decided to adopt the good-faith
uncertainty standard set out in Allentown Mack instead of the previously required good-faith disbelief, which required a higher burden of
proof.183
Policy considerations again influenced the NLRB’s decisionmaking process.184 By making the standard for obtaining an RM
election lower than that required to withdraw recognition of a union,
the NLRB hoped to promote employee freedom of choice and
industrial stability.185 A lower standard for RM elections will assist
those employers who have a good-faith uncertainty of the employees’
support of the union, but may not have actual proof of the union’s
loss of majority status.186 Furthermore, bargaining stability is promoted because incumbent unions cannot lose recognition without
absolute proof of the employees’ repudiation.187 The NLRB recognized that permitting more RM elections could actually interfere with
collective bargaining negotiations.188 However, the NLRB would
rather the negotiations be temporarily disrupted, while the results of
the RM elections are determined, than permanently ended through
an employer’s unilateral withdrawal of recognition.189

179. See Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 379 (1998).
180. See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 15.
181. See Pedrick, supra note 148, at 167.
182. See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 15.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 18. This lower standard for RM elections assumes that in the future the
NLRB will adhere to its new definition of good-faith uncertainty and not revert to the former
“strict head count” procedure. Id.
188. See id. at 15.
189. See id.
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The RM election after Levitz will likely be more useful. The
employer now must show a good-faith doubt of the continued majority status of the union as defined by the Supreme Court in Allentown
Mack.190 However, a major drawback to the RM election process is
the use of the blocking charge.191 Representation elections may not
be held in the presence of unfair labor practices.192 Therefore, as soon
as an RM petition for election is filed, the union will file an unfair
labor practice charge in an effort to stall the election process.193
However, now that Levitz has limited an employer’s ability to withdraw recognition to cases in which the employer has actual proof the
union has lost majority status, the RM petition or polling may be the
only remaining choices. That being said, the Board in Levitz chose to
“leave to a later case whether the current good-faith doubt (uncertainty) standard for polling should be changed.”194 Therefore, even
after Levitz, in order to conduct a poll, an employer must have a
good-faith doubt as to the majority status of the union.
C.

Stare Decisis and the NLRB Decision-Making Process

As an administrative agency, the NLRB has wide latitude over
its rulemaking. Still, the concurring opinion written by Member
Hurtgen in Levitz disagreed with the major points of the majority
decision, stating that it was too quick to overturn a fifty-year-old
precedent.195 “In my view, there are values that are inherent in the
doctrine of stare decisis. These values include stability, predictability,
and certainty of law.”196 For fifty years, employers and unions alike
could count on the three methods of union decertification: withdrawal, elections, and polling. Levitz changed the rules even after the
Supreme Court in Allentown Mack had taken such pains to clear up
the confusion. Some argue administrative agencies like the NLRB
are not under the same confines of stare decisis as courts and
judges.197 However, there is something to be said for stability and
consistency in decisions to provide certainty about the rules of the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998).
See Manuel, supra note 2, at 930–31.
Id. at 931.
Id.
Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 9.
See id. at 20 (Hurtgen, concurring).
Id.
See Pedrick, supra note 148, at 172.
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game. Employers and unions are now learning a new set of rules, all
of which could be upset by a change in the NLRB membership or a
decision overturning Levitz.198
As discussed above, the NLRB has favored the RM elections for
years.199 It is only natural that when pressed to clarify its rules, the
NLRB requires a lesser burden of proof for the preferred method.
However, the practical effect of the Levitz decision may not accomplish what the NLRB had hoped. Employer-union relations are
complicated. The NLRB’s hope that every employer, uncertain
about the majority support of a union, will simply petition for election
and then everyone (employer, union, and employees) will patiently
await the result is naive. In reality, the union will file unfair labor
practice charges to delay the elections, the employer will refuse to
negotiate with the union during the election period, and eventually
the employees will become disenchanted with the union, with the
employer, or with both. The practical effect of Levitz will depend
upon future NLRB determinations of its new dual standard.200
D. Practical Effect of Levitz Furniture Co.
The effect of the Levitz decision remains to be seen as the remaining charges pass through the system under the good-faith doubt
test.201 The method for employers to determine whether a union
continues to enjoy majority support has been made more straightforward by the Levitz decision, although not necessarily less complicated.
One effect of the Levitz decision was to clarify which path the
employer wished to take at the time the union’s majority status
becomes rebuttable. Prior to Levitz, the employer had three options
with the same standard of proof—good-faith doubt. This burden was
much more difficult than the words suggested and employers faced
unfair labor practice charges no matter what choice they made. The
198. It remains to be seen how the change from a Democratic to Republican presidency will
affect the NLRB’s membership.
199. See Pedrick, supra note 148, at 172.
200. The NLRB in Levitz declined to discuss the third use for the good-faith standard, polls,
because it was not presented. One can only assume that since the NLRB dislikes employer
polling as much as it dislikes employers who unilaterally withdraw recognition, a higher
standard for polling could be established as well.
201. The NLRB decided that since it was affecting the evidentiary standard required of
employers, the new standard would only be applied prospectively and any current pending case
should not be subjected to the new standard. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at
18.
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NLRB promoted the use of RM elections by liberalizing the standard
to good-faith uncertainty, and discouraged employers from unilaterally withdrawing recognition by tightening the standard of proof to
actual loss of majority status.202
The general counsel of the NLRB has now defined actual loss of
majority status: actual loss “requires a showing that is greater than
both the Board’s previous ‘uncertainty’ standard and disbelief standard. ‘Actual loss’ requires a showing of an actual numerical loss of a
union’s majority support.”203 To meet its burden of proof, an employer may show actual loss though “untainted, valid evidence, such
as a petition, that establishes that a numerical majority of unit employees no longer desires representation from the incumbent union.”204 The union may then rebut this numerical evidence by
showing that it is unreliable or was obtained through unfair labor
practices.205
Cautious employers would undoubtedly choose the RM election
route in an effort to avoid numerous unfair labor practice charges for
withdrawing recognition. However, unions will undoubtedly file
unfair labor practice blocking charges to halt such elections. Certification elections cannot be held while there are pending unfair labor
practice charges.206 Thus, an employer wishing to avoid unfair labor
practice charges for unilaterally withdrawing recognition will face
blocking charges and the election will be delayed until the unfair
labor practice charge is decided.
On the other hand, an employer who is able to provide proof of
the actual loss of union support may withdraw recognition of the
union and refuse to bargain. Again, numerous unfair labor practice
charges will be filed.207 The employer will have the burden “to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the union had, in fact, lost
majority support at the time the employer withdrew recognition.”208
The NLRB felt it necessary to place the burden upon the employer to
prove a negative, that the union does not have support, because as an
202. See id. at 15.
203. Rosenfeld, supra note 175.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Flynn, supra note 3, at 699.
207. See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 11. Interestingly, the NLRB’s
decision notes “[i]f the union contests the withdrawal of recognition ….” Id. Undoubtedly, any
union would contest the unilateral withdrawal of recognition. See Pedrick, supra note 148, at
170.
208. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 18.
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affirmative defense to unfair labor practice proceedings, the employer
would have the burden.209 Furthermore, the NLRB opined that the
employers have access to the evidence, the information that was
provided to them that they used to decide the union had in fact lost
majority support.210
Ultimately, an employer who withdraws recognition of a union
or files for an RM petition (or even conducts its own poll, which the
NLRB did not discuss in Levitz) faces unfair labor practice charges.
However, the NLRB was trying to alleviate this concern by promoting the use of RM elections. The NLRB’s obvious preference for
Board-controlled elections will more likely lead to a favorable
outcome for the employer who utilizes this procedure. Even an
employer who has proof that a union has lost majority status may
prefer to file a petition for RM election instead of unilaterally
withdrawing recognition.
The NLRB’s obvious distaste for
employers who unilaterally withdraw recognition should caution
those who believe they have hard proof of the union’s loss of majority
status.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB has taken a unitary standard for three different methods of questioning a union’s majority status, and converted it into
different standards that lead to the same result. Before Levitz, if an
employer wished to withdraw recognition of a union, the good-faith
doubt standard (as then applied) required employers to provide a
virtual head count of the employees who no longer supported the
union. Today, the NLRB requires such a head count. An employer
can choose to rely upon its own proof of the union’s loss of majority
support, or an employer can choose to petition for an RM election.
Either way, the process will be delayed by unfair labor practice
charges. Ideally, the policies behind the Act will still prevail, collective bargaining will be encouraged, and employees’ freedom of selforganization and designation of representatives will be respected.

209. See id. at 12.
210. See id.

